Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.

Game Theory will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.

CUSTOMER REVIEWS (Average Customer Rating: 5.0 based on 7 reviews)

No Introduction but Excellent Stuff

Even though Myerson asserts that this book is intended to be "a general introduction to game theory" in Preface, it is difficult to understand for beginners who have not mathematics knowledge in the level of upper class. In this point, the volume is different from other introductions - e.g. Morton Davis' "Game Theory"-, rather is suitable for M.A. or first year Ph.D students. However, this book is not so much for students majoring economics as for various social sceintists in the sense that it does not focus on only "economics" but on pure game "theory" in nearly all areas.

July 21, 2008

Good stuff

excellent book,very comprehensive step by step approach.I especially enjoyed the sections on Nash equilibria and infinite strategies.Great for those who wish to understand the underlying foundations of decision making via both simple and intricate mathematics. The concepts are also explained well in english through generally understood examples.
October 18, 2007

Masterpiece

This book is a masterpiece: it goes from the simple and straightforward (with examples of sequential equilibria) to technical and challenging material (such as the Mertens-Zamir type space). I own Fudenberg-Tirole and Osborne-Rubinstein, but it is Myerson that gets picked up the most. What I find most rewarding is that Myerson introduces everything gently, working from examples to build a general theory.
March 24, 2004

not bad

very comprehensive book. Covers pretty much everything. It's supposed to be a graduate text but undergrads can handle it as long as they know some math and aren't too scared by all the notation. Oh and Myerson is nice guy too.
June 07, 2003

still on the frontier because of disinformation

This book is not good only because it explains all well known difficult concepts which noone so far has been able to explain clearly and rigourosly in one book but for new important topics that are less known for the majority of game theorists. I'm refering to the idea of networks and cooperation structures and also cooperation under uncertainty with the idea of virtual utility.
February 08, 2003

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