For more than a century we've known that much of human evolution occurred in an Ice Age. Starting about 15,000 years ago, temperatures began to rise, the glaciers receded, and sea levels rose. The rise of human civilization and all of recorded history occurred in this warm period, known as the Holocene.Until very recently we had no detailed record of climate changes during the Holocene. Now we do. In this engrossing and captivating look at the human effects of climate variability, Brian Fagan shows how climate functioned as what the historian Paul Kennedy described as one of the "deeper transformations" of history--a more important historical factor than we understand.

Amazon.com Review
A professor of anthropology by training, Fagan traces the effects of climactic change on civilizations over the past 15,000 years--a period of prolonged global warning that has only accelerated over the past 150 years. In particular, he's interested in how civilizations have responded to, or been radically altered by, changes in environment. One of Fagan's most compelling examples is his detailed history of the city of Ur, in what is now modern-day Iraq. Once a great city in one of the world's earliest civilizations, it first thrived thanks to abundant rainfall and then suffered even more severely when the Indian Ocean monsoons shifted southward, changing rain patterns. By 2000 B.C. its agricultural economy had collapsed, and today it is an abandoned landscape, an assemblage of decaying shrines in the harshest of deserts. Fagan views this event as pivotal. It was, he writes, "the first time an entire city disintegrated in the face of environmental catastrophe." But not, Fagan notes, the last. In his epilogue, which covers the last 800 years of human history, Fagan explores the climatic upheavals that left 20 million dead in famine-related epidemics in the 19th century. He notes that today 200 million people barely survive on marginal agricultural land in places such as northeastern Brazil, Ethiopia, and the Saharan Sahel. If temperatures rise much above current levels, and rising seas flood coastal plains, the devastation could dwarf any disaster humankind has previously known. Fagan doesn't offer easy solutions, but he presents a compelling history of climate's role in the background--and sometimes foreground--of human history. --Keith Moerer

CUSTOMER REVIEWS (Average Customer Rating: 4.0 based on 25 reviews)

Not very systematic, but interesting (3.5***)

Many of the historical questions that once existed, such as why the Mayan civilization collapsed, have since been explained by long term climate change, particularly drought. I am unsure what Fagan's specific purpose was in writing this book, which isn't very systematic, but certainly much of it is interesting. Fagan's biggest problem is what to do about providing the facts and understanding of longer term climate change; consequently he can be confusing, so I recommend this book as a possible follow on to Fred Pearce's terrific book, "With Speed and Violence: Why Scientists Fear Tipping Points in Climate Change".

Fagan is also concerned with short term climate change (drought of a year or two or even perhaps the Biblical 7 years) and how civilizations organized to survive them. When geographic areas were way below potential population densities, survival generally involved mobility, and/or taking advantage of less desirable foods. When population densities were high, food storage, and the ability to take advantage of food in other areas through empires, kin relationships or trade provided answers.

The strongest part of the book is Fagan's imagining of what life was like in Cro-Magnon Europe, before and during a warming period, and in the earliest Mesopotamian and Egyptian settlements. Among the many nuggets of information in the book is that the amount of animal protein that humans can safely consume without long term health consequences, even when life expectancy is relatively short, is 50%; the percent needs to be even lower for pregnant women. Another nugget that struck me is that nomads in dry areas can herd cattle rather than sheep or goats because cattle can survive longer without water.

I don't completely trust Fagan as to accuracy. On p.42 he contradicts himself in successive paragraphs as to the Siberian climate between 20,000 and 18,000. He discusses how farming spread into Europe without any mention of what genetic analysis has to say (issue is whether people moved or practices were copied). And as I said, his discussion of climate is sometimes muddled.

September 10, 2008

interesting book

interesting account of how changes in climate may have helped to shape our civilization giving rise to farming and eventually cities
April 04, 2008

Excellent overview of climate's effects on human culture

This slim volume by Brian Fagan provides an excellent overview of the changes in climate effecting human culture over hundreds and thousands of years. The climate changes are shown with their global and regional effects. Professor Fagan then relates the geological changes to gross changes in human culture such as the switch from a hunter-gatherer culture to a settled development of agriculture. He proposes that drought is one of the causes of the growth of cities from villages.

This book could be of benefit in World History, American History, and European History classes in addition to basic enviromental science classes.
October 01, 2007

Climate Didn't Do It All

This is a good book on the effects of climate on history. The other reviews (11 as of this writing) tell the good points. I merely want to add a cautionary note: Dr. Fagan is prone to give only the "climate did it" side of what are often very complex arguments. Most scholars would generally agree with him, and where there are differences I think he is usually on the right side, but he can get too simplistic. Significantly, the cases he knows best are told with more nuance and detail. The story of the Chumash of the Santa Barbara area (where he lived for many years) is particularly good: he shows how they responded creatively and thoughtfully to varying climates. He is also knowledgeable about, and thus nunanced when writing about, Europe and the Atlantic. He is farther from home with the Maya; he gives the most likely scenario for their fall, which involves drought as the key factor, but does not discuss other theories (warfare, trade route shifts, distant power shifts...) that have at least enough merit to be advocated by many Mayanists. Still farther from home is the Tiwanaku case, where he credits the fall of Tiwanaku on drought that may actually have happened a century or two later than the fall. And he has the Old Kingdom of Egypt falling because drought convinced the people that the pharaohs weren't God after all. Surely the Egyptians were more sophisticated than that, and surely the situation was much more complex. Only in old travel accounts does anyone seriously hold the idea that "those other folks" are so dumb that they think the chief is a god because the volcano erupts or the river floods on time.
Looking over European history, I am struck by how little the shift from the Medieval Warm Period to the Little Ice Age affected history. It had its effect, and a lot of people died, but people usually coped well and intelligently. On the other hand, Fagan misses one beautiful case where that shift mattered a lot: the decline of steppe-nomad power and the Silk Road. The Mongols rode out to conquer the world, and the Silk Road flourished, during the Medieval Warm Period. The Little Ice Age ended this--the steppes got too prone to horrible winters that killed the livestock, and the Silk Road got difficult just as the sea lanes were opening up due to Chinese, Arab, Spanish and Portuguese advances in shipping.
Moral: climate affects history greatly, but people don't just let it happen or naively think "God done it." They respond with all sorts of creative and interesting strategies. This emerges from Fagan's book, especially when he talks about Native Americans, but the reader is cautioned to look into the full complexity of the cases he describes.

April 17, 2007

THE SUPERTANKER OF SOCIETY AND THE MEDIEVAL HOT STUFF

This should be a five-star review, but I have deducted a star. First the good points. Why is this book a great achievement? Because it makes an enormously convincing case - that climate is the great under-rated driver of human pre-history (up to about 3100BC, before the invention of writing), and, with a brilliant you-can't-see-the-join sweep, moves the argument through the following historical period.

It is an engaging read. The metaphors and analogies are often good. He compares early man, who adapted and survived the constant storms of climate change, with the way that a wooden yacht rides a storm. The seas may blow at storm force, or even present a 25-metre megawave. A well-battened down yacht will bob like a cork. But, a sophisticated steel supertanker will cut through all the waves as it steams on - it is designed to ignore them, so to speak. Except of course, if a megawave catches it side on, then it will roll over. And it could just hit an iceberg, we all know it has happened. The supertanker is modern civilisation, we have aircon in our houses and cars, we turn on the lights when it gets dark. The electricity could be generated by wind turbines, coal, or nuclear power. Just so long as the lights are on. But a big enough volcano, asteroid hit, or reduced solar gain triggering an ice age? That would be our megawave: we might be rolled over.

He has such a wide sweep of the disciplines: scientific studies of ice cores and lake mud, anthropological studies of the ancient Sumerians, Egyptians, the Greeks, historians like Julius Caesar and Polybius. He is good. He knows that data from carbon dating, pollen studies, ancient written histories, geology, analyses of animal domestication, archaeological digs, and more, all have to handled with interpretive skill to make a coherent story. And the picture gets updated every time a new study rolls off the presses. I take off all my hats to him. He goes into considerable detail over the Medieval Warm Period (AD900-1300). This is important because Europe was as warm and in parts warmer then than it is today, and 21st century climatologists looking for their next tax-dollar research grant do not want you to know about it. They are willing to suppress the data and re-name it to an `anomaly', it ruins their scare-scenarios. The politicians want to sound concerned and raise your taxes too. So it's win-win for them, lose-lose for us. The Medieval Warm Period was extravagantly good for Europe, and bad for the West coast Americas, and Brian Fagan paints a fascinating diptych.

However, I come to review this book, and not to panegyricise. I do not care that his style is somewhat clichéd. I do not much mind that his unidimensional approach to climate-driven history is patently simplistic and ridiculously telescoped near the end. I can read any ordinary history, or economic history like the excellent Richard Bulliet's `The Camel and the Wheel', or Gordon & Rendsburg's `The Bible and the Ancient Near East' for an immensely better straight historical approach.

But what I object to in him in the strongest terms is what philosophers call `scientism'. (Try Mary Midgley, C.S. Lewis, John Wild, Michael Polanyi, or G.K. Chesterton for a good grab-bag of approaches to exploding this. I am coming to conclusion is better to mock it than reason with it. Dawkins is a hard-line offender on this, but there are so many others. They even start their books with stuff along the lines of, "I know I am a mere reductionist, and this is really philosophically silly, but I do not repent and recant because I know not how".) His religion and faith is science. It is belief in evolutionism, not just biological evolution. To him, other faiths (OK, let's get it out, Christianity, he cannot be that bothered to mock animists, Buddhists, or Hindus), are absurd in general. They are amusingly quaint and superstitious. His attitude to the `noble savage' of the Maya/Aztec, the Dakota Sioux, and the woadfully aggressive Celts wavers between the patronising and the politically correct multiculturally pseudo-respectful. The human sacrifice, scalping, and savage gods of the savages somehow fail to hold his attention long enough to actually write of them. (Just try watching the films `A Man Called Horse', and the sequel to get a real idea. Or read `The Epic of Gilgamesh', and the grislier bits of Greek mythology.) His equation of the beliefs of Stone Age man and the faith of builders of Gothic cathedrals is insulting, but there is more to any of them than there is to him. But modern is as modern does. He looks down on our ancestors, not at them. He is infected with what C.S. Lewis called `chronological snobbery'.

And what is science anyway? What is this god that he so worshipfully serves? It is just a description of `How Things Work'. How do plants work? Photosynthesis. How does photosynthesis work? By the chemistry of chlorophyll and capture of the photons of the sun. How does the chemistry work? By electrons being passed around, they are atomic particles, we can calculate the energy gained and lost, and glory, glory, we make bread from the plant and digest it and then we have the energy! QED, cogito ergo sum. You get the idea. Science is about mechanisms, how things work, how the knee-bone is connected to the ankle-bone. But does he `Hear the word of the Lord'? No. He does not know what it all Means, he is all Mechanism. And scientists really are just mechanics. All his many-spendoured anthropological terminological circumlocutions and prestidigitations lead to a big round `nil points' in the point-of-it-all department. `Skias onar anthropos' - 'man is but a dream of a shadow' - so said the ancient Greek, and the ancient Hebrew asked God `What is man that thou art mindful of him?', but in truth he has yet to wake up for the first time to these things. He thinks a lot, but he is not mindful. Man can live without science, and did so for thousands of years, but he cannot live even threescore years and ten without meaning. Let us not kow-tow to Science or its priesthood, either they serve us or destroy us. Only men can rule men. Ignore the soul and you lose it.

November 27, 2006

SIMILAR PRODUCTS

The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History, 1300-1850
by Brian M. Fagan

Floods, Famines, and Emperors : El Nino and the Fate of Civilizations
by Brian Fagan

The Great Warming: Climate Change and the Rise and Fall of Civilizations
by Brian Fagan

Frozen Earth: The Once and Future Story of Ice Ages
by Doug Macdougall

The Winds of Change: Climate, Weather, and the Destruction of Civilizations
by Eugene Linden