| View Larger Image | Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution [An article from: Games and Economic Behavior] | Digitalby D.A. Hojman (Author), A. Szeidl (Author)
| List Price: | $10.95 | | | Available: | Available for download now |
| | Binding: | Digital | | Publisher: | Elsevier | | Page Count: | 18 Pages | | Publication Date: | April 01, 2006 |
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Product Description
This digital document is a journal article from Games and Economic Behavior, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.Description: This paper studies a social game where agents choose their partners as well as their actions. Players interact with direct and indirect neighbors in the endogenous network. We show that the architecture of any nontrivial Nash equilibrium is minimally connected, and equilibrium actions approximate a symmetric equilibrium of the underlying game. We apply the model to analyze stochastic stability in 2x2 coordination games. We find that long-run equilibrium selection depends on a trade-off between efficiency and risk dominance due to the presence of scale effects arising from network externalities. Our results suggest a general pattern of equilibrium selection. |
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