While immigration is often blamed for the rise of populism, it was cost of living and male job dissatisfaction that played a major role in the European surge in support for populist politics a decade ago, according to a University of Cambridge social scientist.
Research by Dr Lorenza Antonucci and her team used data from over 75,000 people across ten countries between 2015 and 2018, when the populist wave crashed across Europe: from the UK’s ‘Brexit’ and Poland’s PiS taking power to the AfD entering the Bundestag. *
Much handwringing has focused on “left-behind outsiders” driving European populism. However, Antonucci’s findings, published in the new book ‘Insecurity Politics’, show that working people increasingly stressed by money worries and disillusioned with their jobs became far more likely to back populist parties.
For people across Europe, feelings of financial insecurity regardless of income – from anxiety over bills to an inability to cover unexpected costs – emerged as by far the strongest predictor of an anti-elite outlook, and of voting for populist parties on both the right and left.
In fact, Antonucci’s research shows that in 2018, scoring above average for worrying about finances increased the chances of voting populist by 17-20 percentage points in Germany, France and Sweden, compared to those who felt more financially secure. **
In the same year, the link between money worries and voting increased populist support in Italy, Spain and the Netherlands by between 4-10 percentage points.
The research also shows that an overall disillusionment with quality of work was linked to voting populist in most of the large European nations, by up to 12 percentage points.
Antonucci points out that, at the time, the two leading parties in several of these countries were only separated by around ten percent of the vote.
“The political party system is extremely fragmented, and most national elections are won by much smaller swings than some of the effects money worries had on votes for radical parties at the height of Europe’s populist wave,” said Antonucci, from Cambridge’s Department of Sociology.
“The cost-of-living crisis is viewed as a post-pandemic shock, but it runs much deeper across Europe in the years following the banking bailout. The data suggest that populist support is rooted in everyday insecurities that affect the lower-middle classes as much as the so-called left behind.”
“Even for people with stable jobs, many workers feel like they are fighting a losing battle against job intensification, work pressure, declining wages, and a loss of control over how they do their job,” said Antonucci, who calls this the hidden face of work-based insecurity.
A further study featured in the book reveals a gender split in the way work quality affects populist support. Antonucci and her team compared data from almost 21,000 statistically-matched pairs of workers across 23 European countries between 2015 and 2018, to investigate how working conditions related to voting intentions. ***
For men, being in a high-pressure job – working at speed to tight deadlines – increases the probability of voting for radical right-wing parties from 14% to 18%.
However, men who felt they were underpaid, lacked career prospects and received little in the way of recognition had an even greater likelihood of voting radical right, with probability shifting from 12% to almost 20% when job dissatisfaction is high.
For men, this workplace disillusionment was a far better predictor of populist voting than a fear of redundancy, which made little difference to populist support.
“Work insecurity is about job quality, not just unemployment,” said Antonucci. “People feel rising pressures and a lack of autonomy, along with limited prospects and a poor work-life balance. For many men, this is about loss of status in society connected to how they are treated at work.”
For women, feelings of economic strain rather than working conditions swayed them towards populism. The probability of voting for populist parties on both left and right rose from 18% to 25% for women who reported difficulties living on their income.
Antonucci argues that this age of financial precarity is compounded by the agendas of big political parties, which push policies that condition citizens to believe individual competition at school and work is the basis of a good life, while moving away from the idea that people also need security to function in society.
“Europe’s mainstream parties have abandoned much of the traditional political ground on security, family and social safety nets, focusing instead on enhancing competitiveness through deregulation, hire-and-fire flexibility, and offering more targeted benefits. This has made our societies more economically competitive, but less socially secure.”
In the book, Antonucci analyses political party manifestos across Europe in the first two decades of this century, showing that populists stepped into this political vacuum by pushing stories of “security”: whether pro-state redistribution on the left, or nativist national solidarity and ‘support for our own’ on the right.
“Populist parties exploited the gap by offering simple answers to insecurity. On the right, that meant claiming voters were losing out to migrants in the competition for jobs, welfare and resources. These parties offer security through welfare chauvinism and a return to the role of the family as provider” said Antonucci.
“Financial insecurity and disillusionment with poor-quality jobs are at the heart of Europe’s populist boom. Hostility towards migrants resonates because money worries and status anxiety are widespread and anti-migration feelings are an easy way to channel frustrations that people have about their lives.”
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Notes:
* The ten European countries are Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden. Minimum 2,500 respondents per country, including 1,000+ employed respondents per country.
** The researchers divided respondents into four groups based on how financially insecure they felt, from the most secure quarter to the most insecure quarter. Comparing someone in the relatively secure first quarter with someone in the more insecure third quarter was associated with a 17-20 percentage point jump in the likelihood of voting populist in Germany, France and Sweden.
*** The research combined two major European surveys: the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). Statistical matching algorithms paired each person in the ESS with a near identical worker in the EWCS, using shared features like age, country, occupation and contract type. Various statistical methods were then used to validate the new dataset and ensure variations had been preserved.
For the purposes of the research, populism is defined as an ideology that divides society into antagonistic groups, and calls for politics to follow the “will of the people”. The research also used PopuList: a scholarly database of European populist parties.