Lott hypothesized that it is the fear of capable, hard-working judges who would be effective, write influential opinions, and change the position of the courts that is creating the delays. That is the last thing one's political opponents want and, at least, confirmation delays will limit the amount of the judge's damage, e.g. time in court. It isn't about party lines; the length of the confirmation process has increased during both recent Republican and Democratic presidencies while the opposition party controlled the Senate. "Merit should matter and Americans presumably want the smartest, most influential people on our courts," Lott states. "But the next time you hear opponents claim that the president's nominee is 'extremist,' think 'smart' instead."
This study is published in the November issue of Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. Media wishing to receive a PDF of this article please contact journalnews@bos.blackwellpublishing.net
The Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (JELS) is a peer-edited, peer-refereed, interdisciplinary journal that publishes high-quality, empirically-oriented articles of interest to scholars in a diverse range of law and law-related fields, including civil justice, corporate law, criminal justice, domestic relations, economics, finance, health care, political science, psychology, public policy, securities regulation, and sociology.
John R. Lott Jr. is at The American Enterprise Institute. He has been published in numerous publications and has taught at Yale, University of Chicago, and Cornell University Law School among others. Dr. Lott is available for media questions and interviews.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies