Recent U.S. Supreme Court terms have seen justices openly accuse one another of rewriting statutes, ignoring precedent and substituting policy preferences for law. Whether in disputes over presidential immunity, administrative power, nationwide injunctions or transgender rights, justices have demonstrated that they aren’t afraid to challenge one another’s reasoning.
However, a new study from political scientists at the University of Massachusetts Amherst suggests those public clashes tell only part of the story.
Analyzing more than six decades of Supreme Court decisions, Donald Snyder , a doctoral candidate in political science, and Caitlyn Pierce , a recent doctoral graduate in political science, found that when justices write dissenting or concurring opinions, they frequently acknowledge the majority’s arguments. The research concludes these concessions don’t just represent collegiality but are strategic efforts to persuade colleagues and preserve influence within the court.
The study, published in American Politics Research , introduces a new measure of what the authors call “appeasement”—the extent to which justices express agreement with certain aspects of the majority opinion while ultimately disagreeing with its conclusion. Using a legal-domain artificial intelligence model trained on nearly 9,000 split decisions issued by the high court from 1946 through 2011, the researchers quantified a judicial behavior that previously had been difficult to measure.
“Our measure is unique in that we’re not just looking at how harsh justices’ language is, but how they change their language over time,” Pierce says. “There’s this underlying psychological element that shows they can be quite strategic.”
Justices closer to the ideological center were significantly more likely to use conciliatory language than their more ideologically extreme colleagues. Appeasement also increased as majority coalitions became larger and more ideologically diverse, suggesting that judicial rhetoric is shaped not just by legal philosophy but also by the practical demands of persuading other justices.
“One benefit of a measure like appeasement is that higher levels could serve as a potential signal that a justice may be more sensitive to the opinions of their peers and perhaps even open to ideological change,” Snyder observes.
Appeasement levels may also offer clues about which justices will emerge as consensus builders. This is especially relevant as court watchers scrutinize potential swing justices and alliances that could shape future decisions.
Though the study period doesn’t extend to the present-day court due to limitations in the dataset, Pierce says she expects future research to examine whether the appeasement pattern has shifted as the court has become more ideologically polarized.
“If I had to make an educated guess, I would assume that it has changed, and we’ve probably seen appeasement drop,” she says, while adding that some justices still appear to be using conciliatory language to preserve working relationships.
Pierce says the study’s contributions extend beyond the bench. She argues the appeasement measure could help researchers analyze congressional debate, executive branch communications and other forms of political speech in which persuasion often hinges on balancing agreement and disagreement.
The findings also suggest that the sharp exchanges dominating the headlines fail to present a complete picture of how the court functions. Even with deep ideological divisions, justices are colleagues who must continue working together long after a single opinion is handed down.
That long view, Pierce says, helps explain why even strongly worded dissents often contain carefully chosen concessions.
“You don’t want to burn every bridge that you cross, because eventually you might need to go back,” she adds.
American Politics Research
Measuring Judicial Appeasement of the United States Supreme Court
9-Jul-2026